Resolution criteria: - "Yes": Wins if, strictly after 2026-10-09T09:23:24Z and at or before 2027-10-09T15:00:00Z, a peer-reviewed publication, a formal announcement from NIST or an equivalent national standards body, or a widely corroborated report from major academic or security research institutions demonstrates a practical, non-implementation-specific break of the ECDSA algorithm itself — meaning a publicly demonstrated attack that can recover an ECDSA private key or forge a valid ECDSA signature without exploiting a side-channel, nonce-reuse, or other implementation flaw, against a standardized curve (e.g., NIST P-256, P-384, or secp256k1) at or above 112-bit security, using classical or quantum computing hardware. - "No": Wins if no such demonstrated break of ECDSA, as defined above, is confirmed strictly after 2026-10-09T09:23:24Z and at or before 2027-10-09T15:00:00Z. Clarifications: - "Broken" means a practical cryptanalytic attack against the ECDSA algorithm itself — not an attack on a specific implementation, library, side-channel, or protocol — that is accepted by the broader cryptographic research community (e.g., presented at a major venue such as CRYPTO, EUROCRYPT, USENIX Security, or formally acknowledged by NIST) within the resolution window. - Announcements of deprecation schedules, theoretical vulnerabilities requiring future quantum hardware not yet built, or partial academic results that do not demonstrate a full key-recovery or signature-forgery attack do not qualify.

• https://csrc.nist.gov
• https://eprint.iacr.org
• https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/recent

Oct 9, 2027, 7:00 AM UTC